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 In her newest book, Pulitzer prize-winning author 
Marilynne Robinson intervenes in a debate that may seem 
remote from her concerns as a novelist. She tells us she 
wants to “examine one side in the venerable controversy 
called the conflict between science and religion” (ix), and 
she does so by examining the origin and argumentation 
of what she calls “parascientific” literature. But in this 
short book, via an argument as compact as her narrative 
style is precise, she does much more than that: she also 
contributes to the growing literature opposing the “New 
Atheists,” makes a foray into intellectual history, and, most 
importantly, implicitly defends the humanities, especially 
literature, as irreplaceable disciplines in our overall attempt 
to understand human nature. 
 Diverse heavy-hitters, such as Terry Eagleton and 
David Bentley Hart,1 have responded to the popularity of 
the “New Atheists,” to Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennet, 
and Christopher Hitchens, among others. But Robinson 
does not stop at this popular polemic. Instead she treats 
these men as the most recent iteration of a larger literature. 
She treats their “scientific” atheism as one more instance of 
illegitimate parascientific reasoning, and she strikes for the 
root of the genre. Her rogue’s gallery also includes Darwin, 
Thomas Malthus, Sigmund Freud, Auguste Comte, Richard 
Rorty, B.F. Skinner, and E.O. Wilson. What connects them 
is a shared conclusion and a shared methodology.
 Robinson wishes to trace an expulsion that all these 
thinkers have voted to be necessary in their different 
(and incompatible) ways. “Mind,” they think, should be 
expelled from our discourse. They all conclude that the 
testimony of individual minds, the experience of human 
subjectivity, should be explained away. (Throughout 
her book, Robinson uses the word “mind” as a short-
hand for humanly subjective experience; my usage will 
imitate hers.) For example, Robinson examines how 
neo-Darwinists attempt to account for human linguistic 
complexity. In their account, verbal complexity evolved 
for mating purposes such that eloquence had a sexual pay-
off. To this, Robinson replies that “charming as the notion 
is that our proto-verbal ancestors found mates through 
eloquent proto-speech,” such an etiology is absurdly blind 
to how mates have been actually selected in recorded 
history, during which “it has very rarely been the case 
that people have had a pool of eligible others to select 
among on the basis of some pleasing trait” (46). In order 
to remain within the narrow walls of possible explanations 
for human experience, however, the neo-Darwinists have 
to resort to treating the subjective experience of any 
kind of altruism as a self-delusion. Robinson examines 
numerous other instances of supposedly scientific rejection 
of humanly subjective experience, but she doesn’t confine 
herself to outraged summaries or sardonic comments. 
She believes she can make out a common methodology. 
This methodology is the glue that holds together the new 
genre of “parascientific” literature that she presumes to 
delineate.   
 Robinson describes the methodology like this: 
“Some allusion to the science of the moment is used as 
the foundation for extrapolations and conclusions that fall 
far outside the broadest definitions of science” (43) and 
yet claim the authority of science. So, for example, E.O. 
Wilson extrapolates from his entomological research the 
sociobiological claim that the human brain is purely an 
instrument for survival, its operations explicable in those 
terms. Or Malthus extrapolates, from “Peter Townsend’s 
observations of overpopulation and starvation among 
dogs stranded on an island stocked with sheep” (40), that 
alleviating the starvation of Britain’s lower classes would 
only make them worse off. Or Darwin extrapolates from 
the biology of origins that Europeans are supreme.2 All of 
these extrapolations require the exclusion of vast tracts of 
subjective experience, require that we, in order to accept 
them, mistrust the felt life of our minds. So the “absence of 
mind” referred to in Robinson’s title is both the common 
conclusion of the parascientific literature she examines and 
also its common premise.
 Even the profound and serious can fall into the 
parascientific trap. Robinson devotes one whole chapter 
to discussing Freud. She begins by recalling Freud’s well-
known interactions with his one-time disciple Jung, to 
whom he insisted that they must never abandon the sexual 
theory, according to which any kind of “spirituality”3 
was explained as repressed sexuality. He told Jung they 
must make of this theory “an unshakeable bulwark” (78). 
Having thus established that Freud sometimes reasoned 
parascientifically, Robinson surprises us again. Freud is 
not to be classed with the figures discussed previously, 
like Dawkins and Malthus. This is because “in a Europe 
fascinated by notions of the radical importance of racial, 
cultural, and national difference, Freud is creating another, 
opposing anthropology, one that excludes these categories 
altogether” (81). In place of the differences between “races” 
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Erratum: 
In the June issue, see Laurence C. Sibley, Jr.’s review of James K. A. Smith’s Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, 
Worldview, and Cultural Formation. The last line of the third paragraph should read, “His Desiring the Kingdom 
argues that it is the heart that leads because it is the heart that hungers for and loves the kingdom; and imagines 
what that kingdom might be” (32).  
and civilizations, he proposed the universality of a psyche 
formed by the primal event of parricide. His oeuvre should 
be interpreted as a radical political offering. It sinks, however, 
to the level of the parascientific for posterity because we 
ignore the historical (subjective!) context of Freud and 
his conversation partners. Also, Robinson points out his 
parascientific assumption that the unstable condition of his 
Europe, and consequently the myth of the psyche by which 
he explained and interpreted it, was normative. Freud was 
one side of an “odd, post-metaphysical conversation, an 
early instance of the conversation that is uniquely modern,” 
so that while we may bless him for his political intentions, 
we may also deplore the conversation as a whole because it 
partook of the parascientific method and conclusion that 
the mind is “not to be credited” (104). Robinson’s book 
is probably worthwhile even just for this excursion into 
intellectual history.
 To return to Robinson’s initial claim that she is writing 
about the conflict between science and religion, how does 
the parascientific absence of mind relate to this conflict? 
According to Robinson, this conflict is more rumored than 
real. It has been most publicly perpetuated by parascientific 
literature; consequently, it is not a conflict between 
science and religion but between religion and illegitimate 
extrapolations from science. Religion’s form of knowing is 
one instance of the larger way of knowing that Robinson 
relates to “mind.” It is the supreme humanly subjective 
experience. Robinson goes to William James’s definition of 
religion from his book The Varieties of Religious Experience 
to argue that religion’s essence is solitary and inward. 
Religion, in short, is the paramount function of mind; 
if mind is self-deception, religion is the paramount self-
deception.4 Robinson’s book was collected from her Terry 
Lectures at Yale, lectures annually delivered on the relation 
of science and religion; but she performs a remarkable 
rhetorical maneuver with this theme: the conflict of science 
and religion turns out to be a front for a more pervasive 
conflict, the conflict between parascience and “mind.”
 While the careful reader may find Robinson’s own 
analysis reductive at points—for  instance, she uncarefully 
periodizes and characterizes the “modern,” and she relies 
upon William James’s dubious individualist understanding 
of religion that seems to forget its social dimensions5—
on the whole she emerges in this book as a powerful 
defender of the interpretive value of human subjectivity, 
of a non-reductive account of the world. One feels, at 
the end, an urge to return to her novels, her supremely 
sensitive explorations of human subjectivity, equipped 
with a theoretical understanding of their value. Thus, 
while Absence of Mind at first appears remote from the 
concerns of Robinson the novelist, its ultimate effect is to 
rehabilitate humane studies, to demonstrate the necessity 
of descriptions of mind, like her novels, for the study of 
human nature.         
      
Endnotes
1. See Reason, Faith and Revolution: Reflections on the 
God Debate, by Terry Eagleton, and Atheist Delusions: 
The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies, 
by David Bentley Hart.
2. Robinson distinguishes between Darwin’s 
parascientific arguments and his legitimate scientific 
work: so, for instance, between The Descent of Man 
and The Origin of Species (52-53).
3. Jung: “in the intellectual, not the supernatural sense” 
(77). 
4. In fact, reminding us of the preference of Rev. John 
Ames in her novel Gilead, Robinson writes that “if 
I were not myself a religious person, but wished 
to make an account of religion, I believe I would 
tend toward the Feuerbachian view that religion is 
a human projection of humanity’s conceptions of 
beauty, goodness, power, and other valued things, 
a humanizing of experience by understanding it as 
structured around and mirroring back those values” 
(127). 
5. She does attempt to deflect this criticism, arguing 
that James’s focus upon individual accounts of inward 
experience (which never include the experience of 
corporate worship for example) takes place within a 
denominational context and bears strong resemblance 
to accounts that emerged from the two Great 
Awakenings. But these observations don’t obviate the 
fact that James considered religion an entirely private, 
solitary, internal phenomenon.
